Suchergebnisse

Borders are not definite, they can change over time. Recent examples are the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. Within countries, borders between municipalities can change as well. Border changes can be relatively peaceful, like it was the case in Czechoslovakia, but they can also go together with violence, like it was the case with Eastern Timor. This book contains a study of the incentives individuals have to form jurisdictions, using throughout a microeconomic approach. Consecutively, the roles of public good provision, of intergovernmental transfers and of violence are discussed. The analysis argues that individuals have incentives to form jurisdictions that are smaller than optimal from a social welfare point of view, but that intergovernmental transfers can alleviate this. The discussion on violence sheds some light on the incentives for the use of violence and how this affects political outcomes.

This paper studies the equilibrium size of countries. Individuals in small countries have greater influence over the nature of political decision mak- ing while individuals in large countries have the advantage of more public goods and lower tax rates. The model implies that (i) there exists excessive incentives to separate, though this need not be the case for all sets of seces- sion rules studied; (ii) an exogenous increase in public spending decreases country size; (iii) countries with a presidential-congressional democracy are larger than countries with a parliamentary democracy.

We examine the incentives of regions to unite and separate. Separation allows for greater influence over the nature of political decision making while unification allows regions to exploit economies of scale in the provision of government. Our paper explores the influence of size, location and the diversity within regions in shaping this trade-off. We then examine the way in which alternative political institutions aggregate regional preferences and thereby define the number of countries.

We analyze a simple model of local public good provision in a country consisting of a large number of heterogeneous regions, each comprising two districts, a city and a village. When districts remain autonomous and local public goods have positive spillover effects on the neighbouring district, there is underprovision of public goods in both the city and the village. When districts unite, underprovision persists in the village (and may even become more severe), whereas overprovision of public goods arises in the city as urbanites use their political power to exploit the villagers. From a social welfare point of view, inhabitants of the village have insufficient incentives to vote for unification. We examine how national transfers to local governments can resolve these problems.

We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to separate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives to unite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on the whole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessive incentives to separate. This leads us to examine the scope of alternative political insititutions and rules in overcoming the potential inefficciency. Our paper also provides a wide range of examples to illustrate the different instituions used in actual practice to resolve such problems.

We examine the incentives of regions in a country to unite or to separate. We find that smaller regions have greater incentives to unite, relative to larger regions. We show, however, that on the whole, majority voting on separation and union generates excessive incentives to separate. This leads us to examine the scope of alternative political institutions and rules in overcoming the potential inefficiency. Our paper also provides a wide range of examples to illustrate the different institutions used in actual practice to resolve such problems.